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ABSTRACT
The emergence of digital dossiers in Courts of Law presents
new opportunities to streamline the criminal prosecution
chain. This papers proposes the use of agent technology to
support automatic verification of consistency and complete-
ness of data in such dossiers. It sketches how agent systems
in combination with other AI technology, can be used to en-
force consistency and completeness in digital dossiers in the
context of the semi-open environment of the Courts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.4 [Information Systems]: Database Management—
Distributed databases
1. INTRODUCTION
Technology is changing today’s law practice. The use of
digital dossiers by the Public Prosecution and Courts of
Law in trials is an example. Consistency and completeness
of digital dossiers are major challenges in this context. In
the semi-open environment of the Courts these challenges
are magnified: different sources of information distributed
both physically and across organizations need to work to-
gether within fixed boundaries set by the law to compile a
dossier. Potentially good solutions to ensure consistency and
completeness of digital dossiers may not be sufficient if the
characteristics of the semi-open environment are not taken
into account. This paper identifies important issues with re-
gard to the completeness of digital dossiers and consistency
of data. Possible solutions for automatic completeness and
consistency checking of digital dossiers, based on AI tech-
niques, are discussed. Agent technology, one of paradigms
deployed within AI, is used to efficiently apply these tech-
niques to the digital dossier.
The digital dossier is the focus of the Agent-based Crim-
inal Court Electronic Support Systems (access) project1.
1http://www.iids.org/access
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The access project aims to explore the feasibility of a fully
distributed system, to support users based on knowledge
of user preferences, to support information sharing between
users, and to improve the overall efficiency of current prac-
tice. Deploying agent technology to ensure completeness
and consistency of digital dossiers using data scattered over
a large number of different physically distributed organiza-
tions is one of the main objectives of the project. Agent
technology [5, 8, 17] is a promising and enabling technology
in such large scale distributed environments. Artificial In-
telligence, for instance, when embedded in agent technology,
offers new possibilities with regard to the digital dossier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides a motivating example that illustrates the
complexities involved in a criminal prosecution chain for a
juvenile repeat offender. Section 3 introduces the digital
dossier and describes the context of the semi-open environ-
ment as holds for Courts of Law. Section 4 then explains
the main issues and possible solutions for consistency and
completeness in the semi-open environment of the Courts.
The paper ends with a discussion and conclusions.
2. THECRIMINALPROSECUTIONCHAIN
OF A JUVENILE REPEAT OFFENDER
A trial and its preparation involves numerous organiza-
tions. This process starts once someone is suspected, con-
tinues through trial preparation and ends with a verdict and
execution of a sentence. This whole process is called a crim-
inal prosecution chain. An example of a criminal prosecu-
tion chain for a juvenile repeat offender is illustrated below.
This example has been constructed from an actual case. All
personal information has been anonymized and numerous
details have been omitted. However it does illustrate the
complexities involved in such cases. Note that this scenario
describes the current Dutch situation, legal constraints are
also analyzed in a Dutch legal setting, according to Dutch
law.
This criminal prosecution chain starts when the Police
arrest a juvenile suspect for vandalism. The subject is es-
corted to the Police station where an assistant prosecutor
questions the suspect. The Police open a new dossier specif-
ically for this case. This dossier contains a summary of the
offense for which the subject is being charged, the date and
location of the incident, number of suspects, personal data
of the victim, the official police report, and other relevant
information. The suspect then becomes the subject of in-
vestigation: the personal data he/she has provided is cross
referenced with the Municipal Database.2 The Police also
queries local Repeat Offender Databases to discover whether
this subject is a known repeat offender. As this case con-
cerns a minor, a request is issued to other organizations for
juvenile offenders, to provide relevant information about the
minor’s background. All of this information is added to the
dossier.
After collecting this information, the Police and the Assis-
tant Prosecutor inform the Public Prosecutor of the case and
transfer the dossier. The Public Prosecutor decides whether
to press charges or, to pursue an alternative if other (mi-
nor) punishment is deemed more suitable. This decision is
based both on the specific details of the current case and the
(criminal) history of the offender. A dedicated Judicial Doc-
umentation Database is used to retrieve information on the
criminal past of the subject. Typically, at this point, the
Public Prosecutor will again consult Municipal Databases
and local Juvenile Repeat Offender Systems. All informa-
tion is cross referenced with the case dossier and information
is updated when needed.
If the Public Prosecutor decides to bring the case to court,
as is the case, the next mandatory step involves informing
the Council for Child Defence. In the Dutch context the
Council for Child Defence has the task to investigate all
crimes of minors. In addition to the criminal offenses of the
minor, the family situation and other relevant social factors
are taken into account. This results in a motivated advice
for suitable punishment of the subject. This advice is added
to the dossier. The prosecutor then serves a summons and
a lawyer is assigned to the juvenile subject. Adding the
summons to the dossier finalizes the dossier at this point. A
copy of the dossier is sent to the Court and to the lawyer of
the subject.
To check the correctness of the dossier, the presiding judge
may query judicial history and other judicial documentation
in the Judicial Documentation Database as well as informa-
tion from Municipal and other databases.
At the court session the information in the dossier is used
by all parties involved. The Public Prosecutor demands a
suitable sentence, the lawyer presents the defense and ulti-
mately the judge comes to a verdict. The subject is sen-
tenced and all information regarding the court session is
added to the dossier. The dossier itself is filed in Judicial
Documentation Database for future reference.
3. THE DIGITAL DOSSIER
The example scenario presented in the previous section
illustrates that not only numerous parties are involved, but
also many databases are consulted in a rather simple case
such as that of a juvenile repeat offender, often more than
once. The result is often a sizable dossier. The Courts of
Amsterdam and Rotterdam are currently exploring the po-
tential of a digital version of this dossier in a pilot study.
The digital dossier can be seen as the center of a large dis-
tributed system that consist of all organizations, such as
Police, Courts, municipal databases etc., see Figure 1.
The information comes from many different sources: the
combined systems of the Courts, the Public Prosecution,
the Police and all other parties together form a semi-open
2This database contains, for each citizen of a municipal, per-
sonal information such as name, date of birth, sex, marital
status, and family relationships.
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Figure 1: The Digital Dossier depends on –and
interacts with– data from a large number of dis-
tributed databases.
system, not quite an open system, nor a completely closed
system. An open system is a computer system that is con-
figured to allow access to outside parties. In contrast, in
a closed system only known users are allowed access (after
authorization) to parts of a computer system. The systems
used to compile a digital dossier, are neither closed nor open:
the organizations involved are known, but are not allowed
to access each others’ systems/databases. Each individual
organization is responsible for its own systems, and infor-
mation provision. Requests are honored, systems trusted.
Sometimes information from outside sources is used.
The Police, the Public Prosecution Service, the Courts
and the Prisons together form the backbone of the Dutch
criminal prosecution chain. As illustrated in the example
in Section 2 there is an order in this chain. The Police
and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the criminal
investigation. The Public Prosecutor is responsible for the
prosecution followed by the Court. The Court is responsible
for judging cases. The Prisons are responsible for executing
sentences. (Note that the latter organization does not play a
role in the above scenario). Each organization in this chain
depends on the information provided by organizations con-
sulted in previous phases of the criminal prosecution chain.
These include organizations such as Municipalities and the
Counsel for Child Defense. Each organization involved in
the criminal prosecution chain uses its own computer sys-
tem/databases to process, store and share information. Cur-
rently digital information exchange between organizations is
being explored/pursued.
Each organization’s computer systems can be seen as stand
alone systems, i.e., as closed systems. Only police officers
can access the computer system used by the Police and only
employees of the Public Prosecution can access (parts of)
dossiers at the Public Prosecution. However, as all of these
systems (can) exchange information, the chain of systems is
no longer a closed system. The characteristics of each site
can vary considerably: they can have different procedures for
access, reliability and/or security. For example, a Munici-
pal Database that contains name and address information
has other goals (and thus system characteristic) than a com-
puter system that stores DNA of individuals. Moreover, at
several places in the system there are outgoing connections
to public (open) computer systems, e.g. systems that pro-
vide up to date information concerning the current state of
a law etc. Thus the system as a whole constitutes an exam-
ple of a semi-open system: a system that is not completely
closed, but certainly also not completely open.
Semi-open systems are challenging for numerous reasons.
It is complex to ensure in such systems that privacy sen-
sitive data is well protected against malicious intent, and
to ensure that other less sensitive information is available
to a more general public [13]. Such systems generally tend
to make all data harder to access, including the less sen-
sitive information that can be of interest to a large public.
This phenomenon is known as ‘label creep’ in literature [11].
Other security related problems of semi-open systems deal
with access control, confidentiality and integrity of data,
see [16] for a discussion of the security requirements in such
a system. From a legal perspective, it not clear what kind of
integration of the individual systems is allowed by (Dutch)
law.
For this reason the digital dossier is currently based on
paper exchange/fax copies of files. Currently, for this pilot,
(paper) versions of all files are scanned and stored as pdf-
files in the digital dossier. A web-based user interface allows
a user to access the digital dossier, take notes by marking up
their own copy of files, and share notes if so wished. A future
version of the digital dossier will also incorporate machine
parsable (XML like) content, including multi-media material
(sound, images and video).
The access project assumes the above mentioned prob-
lems will be solved, and that digital information exchange
will be possible. The result is thus an example of a dis-
tributed system: a system with physically distributed sources,
distributed across organizational boundaries. A distributed
digital dossier [16] is then an option. Information is managed
by the authority responsible for the data. A new instance of
a digital dossier is created by the Public Prosecutor when a
new case is presented and the Public Prosecutor decides to
prosecute a defendant.
A newly created dossier consists of records and meta data.
The meta data contains information such as the access con-
trol list (who may read and alter the dossier), what type
of information needs to be present in a dossier (for com-
pleteness checks, see Section 4). The meta data part of the
dossier is stored in the database at the Public Prosecution.
Individual records are distributed over the responsible or-
ganizations: personal information is maintained by the Mu-
nicipal Database, family related information for juveniles
is maintained by the Council for Child Defence etc. This
ensures that information in the digital dossier is kept as up-
to-date as the information known to the responsible orga-
nizations. When information changes this is flagged by the
responsible organization and synchronized with the dossier
at the Public Prosecution.
Thus the dossier itself is stored at the Public Prosecu-
tion while relevant records are maintained and stored by
the responsible organizations and then synchronized with
the digital dossier at the Public Prosecution, when neces-
sary. Consistency and completeness are, however, aspects
that need to be guaranteed.
An agent-based system has been designed to support ac-
cess to the distributed digital dossier, completeness and con-
sistency. Rather then using ‘classical’ distributed informa-
tion systems [10, 12, 15] agent technology has been cho-
sen because it provides a means to distribute responsibil-
ities and tasks across interacting distributed autonomous
systems. Moreover, agent systems are inherently modular
–since separate functionality can implemented by specific,
dedicated agents– and are ideal for deployment in large scale
distributed environments.
Dedicated software agents can be programmed to perform
the task of guarding consistency both within a source and
between sources within the digital dossier, and notifying ap-
propriate (human) parties when needed. With respect to
completeness dedicated agents can monitor the availability
of necessary documents in the digital dossier. For instance,
a trial cannot start if a copy of the original police report is
not in the digital dossier. Software agents can guard such
completeness issues [14].
4. COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY
An information management system as used by the Courts
needs to adhere to a large range of requirements of which
the most important are: completeness, consistency, security
and reliability . The focus of this paper is on completeness
and consistency. In [16] the security issues related to the
distributed digital dossier are discussed. Reliability can in
general be guaranteed by introducing enough redundancy
in the system, such as local (secure) caching and multiple
(physical) network connections between sites. The remain-
der of this section sketches how AI techniques can be de-
ployed to enforce completeness and consistency checks. The
emphasis is not be on the particular details of the individual
techniques, but rather on how multi agent systems can be
used to combine techniques efficiently.
Completeness requirements can be formulated for each
type of offense. Some information, such as personal informa-
tion regarding the defendant as well as the offense for which
the defendant is charged and the original police report need
to be included in each and every dossier. In addition, sup-
plementary offense specific information is often required, e.g.
as the scenario in Section 2 illustrates, in a case involving
a minor the Council for Child Defence needs to investigate
the minor’s past and his or her family/social situation.
Automatic completeness checks of dossiers involves the
following:
• Determine for each type of offense which information
is mandatory.
• Check if all the mandatory information is in the dossier
before it is sent to the Court and the defendant’s lawyer.
Determining which information is mandatory for each type
of offense is a mainly static process, although laws can change.
As a result, this information may need to be updated dur-
ing the course of an investigation. A domain expert needs
to identify which information is mandatory. Knowledge ac-
quisition [1] techniques can be used to support this process.
The domain of, for example, all legal cases involving juve-
niles, is very large. Therefore some kind of automated tech-
niques, e.g. based on clustering [6], can be used for an initial
categorization of mandatory information in dossiers. This
categorization should ultimately form a legal ontology [7].
This ontology is then stored in the meta-data of a dossier,
allowing software agents to check completeness.
Automatically checking the completeness of a dossier is a
more dynamic task. A dedicated software agent is ideal for
this. Each dossier can have its own agent responsible for
checking completeness, that can warn a human user that a
dossier is not complete. An incomplete case can not be sent
to the Court.
Internal consistency of data3 in individual dossiers forms
an important requirement which should be possible to en-
force when the data is available digitally. Thus, if an orga-
nization, e.g. the Council for Child Defence, adds a record
to a dossier, the system checks whether the information is
consistent with all other information in the dossier, using
e.g. personal information, such as name, address, age and
sex of the subject. Consistency also entails checks for rea-
sonable entries in data fields, e.g. the age of subjects should
be in the range 0–120, and other checks, e.g. some bank
account numbers and (Dutch) social security numbers allow
simple tests (comparable to checksums) that can very if the
number represents a possible value.
Checking internal consistency is, in fact, strongly related
to the matching problem. Simply checking to see if e.g. new
personal data added to a digital dossier matches existing
data is not enough. Even if a dossier is well structured,
and all system interaction is based on the same common
ontology, a large information management system [4], may
not discover inconsistencies such as those due to mismatches
caused e.g. by typing errors. If a system does not recognise
the similarity between e.g. the name in a digital dossier and
the name submitted, the receiving system may, for example,
create a new entry in a database. This problem needs to be
considered, especially given the semi-open environment of
the Courts. A more robust method is needed to enforce
internal consistency in digital dossiers: fuzzy matching tech-
niques[2] provide a means to identify partial matches. It is
not clear if automated systems can be based on these results.
Enforcing consistency is a far more dynamic problem then
completeness checking. Especially in the case of a distributed
digital dossier where data in a record can change at any mo-
ment before the dossier is sent to the Court. Again, agents
can be used to enforce consistency checks. A dedicated agent
can be made responsible for the consistency checks of each
individual dossier, interacting with dedicated agents respon-
sible for the information at the source. This central agent
should only allow the addition and/or altering of informa-
tion if this is consistent with the remainder of the dossier.
When conflicts arise a human user needs to be notified of
this and further handle the inconsistency.
Checking consistency between several dossiers, e.g. in
cases with multiple suspects, can be handled in a similar
matter as described above. As long as there is a clear on-
tology, a dedicated agent can be assigned to the task of
checking inter-consistencies of dossiers.
Consistency and completeness of data in large informa-
tion systems is a notoriously hard problem. In the context
of the Courts, inconsistencies and incompleteness of data
can lead to postponing trials or even a mistrial. Thus, auto-
matically identifying incompleteness and inconsistencies in
3Internal consistency of a digital dossier should not be con-
fused with data integrity of a digital dossier. The latter
ensures that data is preserved during operations, e.g. when
data is transferred over a network. While the former ad-
dresses the problem of preventing conflicting information in
one dossier.
dossiers can have large benefits for the (clogged) legal sys-
tem. Automatically fixing (part of) these problems can have
similar benefits.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The above section discusses a number of technical aspects
associated with the completeness and consistency checks in
the digital dossier. However, due to the specific domain of a
Court of Law, some legal constraints also have to be taken
into account.
The legal requirement of consistency and maintaining the
integrity of the dossier becomes more urgent when dossiers
are digitally built, stored and managed. To ensure that
information is only added by an authorized entity, adding
and changing information must be traceable. It must also be
clear who has the right of access when, and what the rights
of this party are. It is clear that access of the lawyer of the
defendant is very limited, and usually restricted to the phase
when the dossier is finalized4. His/her rights to make any
changes will be even less, or virtually non-existent. Yet, the
status of a document can depend on how much it is needed
in a specific phase of the procedure. During custody, for
instance, the defense may need direct access to hearings of
witnesses.
With regard to the legal requirement of completeness the
Dutch Supreme Court has formulated a criterion regarding
documents in the dossier: to the extent that documents may
influence evidence, it must be assumed that the Defense, the
Judge and the Public Prosecutor will add all documents re-
garding the research to the dossier. All documents that may
reasonably be relevant to the position of the suspect must be
included in the dossier. The Judge can, when requested by
the Defense and the Public Prosecutor, officially order cer-
tain documents to be added to the dossier. Data concerning
the use of special research methods such as infiltration and
(wire)taps, even if they do not lead to relevant results, must
always be added to the dossier [3].
Another issue, that needs to be addressed in future re-
search, concerns the legal implications of exchanging infor-
mation between several organizations in the semi-open envi-
ronment of the courts. At the moment it is not clear, from a
legal perspective, what information (if any) may be shared
automatically and what information can only be shared af-
ter an explicit approval of an authorized party.
Finally, an information management system for the Courts
not only needs to address the issues concerning completeness
and consistency of the digital dossier. Other requirements,
in particular security requirements [16] but also e.g. reli-
ability and user-friendliness of the resulting system, need
to be considered. At the moment a proof-of-concept im-
plementation of such a system is being developed using the
AgentScape [9] agent platform.
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